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Abstract
We propose a new kind of individual attack, based on randomly selected
dissipation, on Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol of practical quantum key
distribution (QKD) system with lossy and noisy quantum channel. Since an
adversary with super quantum channel can disguise loss and errors induced
by his attack as that of the system, he can obtain innegligible amount of
information for a practical QKD system, without being detected by legal
participants.
Keywords: quantum key distribution, security, individual attack
The dissipation of quantum channel has been employed in attacking Ben-
nett 1992 protocol in a practical quantum key distribution system[1]. Here
we propose a new kind of individual attack named dissipation attack to get
information of the row key generated by Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol in
a practical QKD system with lossy and noisy quantum channel.
1. Analysis of dissipation along the direction of a linear polarized photon
state: as shown in Fig.1, a, b are two orthogonal directions, any optical
signal will be decomposed into two components along a, b direction by po-
larization beam splitter. Suppose that light intensity of the signal is I, the
intensity of components in directions a, b are Ia, Ib and the amplitudes are
A0, A
′
0, respectively. Assume that the direction of dissipation is a, the ratio
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of intensity dissipation is α, the amplitude in direction a after dissipation is
A, then we have
A
A0
=
√
α, (1)
thus
tgθ
tgθ0
=
√
α. (2)
Since the polarization direction of transmitted photon has been changed
from θ0 to θ, it is clear that the attack dissipation will lead to errors.
Figure 1: Dissipation along the polarization direction of a polarized qubit
2. Randomly selected dissipation attack : Consider the quantum key dis-
tribution system using Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, which transmitting
photon in states |H〉, |pi
4
〉 for 0, and |V 〉, |3pi
4
〉 for 1.
Figure 2: Conjugate coding of photon state
Our attack scheme is as follows. The adversary randomly selects each
of the four polarization directions as the dissipation direction to keep the
balance between 0 and 1 of the bit string transmitted in the quantum channel,
so that the legal users will not find the existence of the adversary. It is
2
necessary to assume that the adversary has a super quantum channel with
much less loss and error.
We shall also investigate the attack scheme with dissipation randomly
along one of the two directions of Breidbart bases[6].
(1) Attack with dissipation along the polarization direction of state |V 〉.
If we chose the dissipation direction along the polarized direction of one of
the four states of BB84 protocol, the attack effect is the same. So, without
loss generality, we choose the direction of |V 〉 as dissipation direction to
analysis the attack effect. For qubits in states |H〉, |V 〉, intensity of the
qubits will be changed, though such change does not cause measurement
errors. However, for qubits in states |pi
4
〉, |3pi
4
〉, errors will occur after attack,
only the components in the direction |V 〉 will dissipate.
Figure 3: Dissipation scheme 1
We define the bit enduring large dissipation the strong dissipation bit
b. In contrast, weak dissipation bit is denoted as b¯. We can see that after
dissipation with ratio α, the intensity of a strong dissipation bit reduces to
I
(1)
b =
1
2
(I|V 〉 + I| 3pi
4
〉) =
1
2
(αI0 +
1
2
αI0 +
1
2
I0) =
1
4
(1 + 3α)I0, (3)
and the intensity of a weak dissipation bit reduces to
I
(1)
b¯
=
1
2
(I|H〉 + I|pi
4
〉) =
1
2
(I0 +
1
2
αI0 +
1
2
I0) =
1
4
(3 + α)I0, (4)
then the average intensity of each bit decreases to
I(1) =
1
2
(I
(1)
b + I
(1)
b¯
) =
1
2
(1 + α)I0. (5)
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The probability of a legal user receiving the strong dissipation bit b is:
p
(1)
b =
I
(1)
b
I
(1)
b + I
(1)
b¯
=
1
2
− 1
4
× 1− α
1 + α
, (6)
the probability of receiving the weak dissipation bit b¯ is
p
(1)
b¯
=
I
(1)
b¯
I
(1)
b + I
(1)
b¯
=
1
2
+
1
4
× 1− α
1 + α
, (7)
where p
(1)
b + p
(1)
b¯
= 1, 1
4
≤ p(1)b ≤ 12 ≤ p(1)b¯ ≤ 34 .
Since the polarization of states |pi
4
〉,|3pi
4
〉 has been changed during the
dissipation, they will lead to errors. For θ0 =
pi
4
, we obtains error rate as
below:
η(1) =
1
2
sin2(θ0 − θ) = 1
4
× 1− α
1 + α
× 1−
√
α
1 +
√
α
. (8)
(2) Dissipation attack along the direction of Breidbart bases.
Figure 4: Breidbart bases
If dissipation direction is one of d and e which are used in Breidbart attack
on the BB84 protocol, the effect of dissipation is the same, so we select d
as dissipation direction to analysis the effect. Intensity of the sending states
will all be effected. In this situation, intensity of the bit b = 1 will be effected
most by dissipation, so we call b = 1 as strong dissipation bit and b¯ = 0 as
weak dissipation bit.
4
Suppose the dissipation has been executed on every bit. After dissipation
with ratio α, the intensity change of strong dissipation bit is shown on the
right in Fig.5, and that of weak dissipation bit is on the left. We now take
qubit in states |V 〉, |pi
4
〉 as example to show the effect of dissipation. It can
be seen that the dissipation effect of qubit in states |3pi
4
〉, |H〉 is the same as
that in |V 〉, |pi
4
〉.
Figure 5: Dissipation scheme 2
By dissipation in the direction d, the intensity of the strong dissipation
bit corresponding to qubit in state |V 〉 or state |3pi
4
〉 reduces to
I
(2)
b =
1
2
(I|V 〉 + I| 3pi
4
〉) = (α cos
2(
pi
8
) + sin2(
pi
8
))I0 =
α + (
√
2− 1)2
1 + (
√
2− 1)2 I0, (9)
and the intensity of the weak dissipation bit reduces to
I
(2)
b¯
=
1
2
(I|H〉 + I|pi
4
〉) = (α sin2(
pi
8
) + cos2(
pi
8
))I0 =
1 + α(
√
2− 1)2
1 + (
√
2− 1)2 I0, (10)
then the average intensity becomes
I(2) =
1
2
(I
(1)
b + I
(1)
b¯
) =
1
2
(1 + α)I0. (11)
The probability of a legal user receiving a strong dissipation bit b is
p
(2)
b =
I
(1)
b
I
(1)
b + I
(1)
b¯
=
1
2
−
√
2
4
× 1− α
1 + α
, (12)
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and the probability of a legal user receiving a weak dissipation bit b¯ is
p
(2)
b¯
=
I
(1)
b¯
I
(1)
b + I
(1)
b¯
=
1
2
+
√
2
4
× 1− α
1 + α
. (13)
Where p
(2)
b + p
(2)
b¯
= 1, 2−
√
2
4
≤ p(2)b ≤ 12 ≤ p(2)b¯ ≤ 2+
√
2
4
.
In this kind of attack, error occurs in the measurement of all the four
states. For the strong dissipation bit, θ0 =
3pi
8
, tgθ = (
√
2 + 1)
√
α, error rate
is
η
(2)
b = sin
2(θ0 − θ) = (1−
√
α)2
(
√
2− 1 + (√2 + 1)√α)2 + (1−√α)2 , (14)
For the weak dissipation bit, ϕ0 =
pi
8
, tgϕ = (
√
2− 1)√α, error rate is
η
(2)
b¯
= sin2(ϕ0 − ϕ) = (1−
√
α)2
(
√
2 + 1 + (
√
2− 1)√α)2 + (1−√α)2 , (15)
So in this attack scheme, average error rate is
η(2) =
1
2
(η
(2)
b + η
(2)
b¯
) =
1
4
× (1−
√
α)2
1 + α
. (16)
It can be seen that
η(2) = η(1), (17)
so the error rate induced by these two dissipation attack schemes can be
denoted by one parameter η, and
η =
1
4
× 1− α
1 + α
× 1−
√
α
1 +
√
α
. (18)
3. Relation between error rate and the information adversary obtained. For
the first attacking scheme, we have
6
α =
4p
(1)
b − 1
3− 4p(1)b
, (19)
then,
η =
1
2
(√
3
4
− p(1)b −
√
p
(1)
b −
1
4
)2
. (20)
For the second attacking scheme, we have
α =
1−√2(1− 2p(2)b )
1 +
√
2(1− 2p(2)b )
, (21)
then,
η =
√
2
4
√2 +√2
4
− p(2)b −
√
p
(2)
b −
2−√2
4
2 . (22)
The relations between η and p
(i)
b (i = 1, 2) are shown in Fig.6.
Figure 6: Relations between probabilities the adversary get and the error rate caused by
the attacks
Let the adversary’s information of ith attack scheme is Hi = 1−H(p(i)b ).
The relations between error rate η and Hi, i = 1, 2 shown in Fig.7. Though
our schemes are not belong to general individual attack based on probe qubits
7
Figure 7: Relations between error rate caused by attacks and the information obtained by
adversary
and unitary transformation, they still satisfy an inequality presented in [5]:
H/η < 2.9. Why this relation still holds for the dissipation attack is worth
to be investigated.
4. Analysis of feasibility : assume the adversary own a supper quantum
channel without loss and errors. For simplicity, assume the legal user have
an ideal single photon detector. In the first attack, the adversary randomly
chooses four directions to dissipate, so the user will generate a uniform dis-
tribution “0,1” bit string, meanwhile, according to the adversary, the bit
string dissipated with |H〉, |pi
4
〉’s direction will generate 1 with greater proba-
bility, as who dissipated with |V 〉, |3pi
4
〉’s direction will generate 0 with greater
probability.
In order to avoid being caught, it is required that not only the “0, 1”
distribution of the bit string tempered is uniform, but also the loss and error
rate induced should equal to the system’s intrinsic loss and error rate. As long
as the system’s error rate reach 5%, the dissipation rate α can reach 0.251,
it corresponds to the loss of 10.2 km standard single-mode fiber. Meanwhile,
the effect of attack is p
(1)
b = 0.350, p
(2)
b = 0.288, and the adversary obtains
H1 = 0.066, H2 = 0.133 bit information each bit of the key, respectively.
The attacks described above does not require the adversary equipped
with single-photon source, single-photon detector, probe qubits and related
unitary evolution. It will be accomplished if the adversary has super quan-
tum channel and can dissipate each qubit in a randomly chosen direction.
By comparison, photon-number-splitting attack and intercept-resend attack
require more abilities for the adversary.
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